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[T]he preamble of an act is instructive of legislative in-
tent, and as such it must be considered that the legislature
intended to recognize the rights of Wisconsin citizens to be
free from the harmful effects of a damaged environment
where it can be shown that the person alleging injury resides
in the area most likely to be affected by the agency action in
question. Such is the situation in the instant case.-4
The final issue raised was whether WED has standing to
represent its members where the allegations of injury relate
solely to the members' individual interests. The court resolved
the issue by again adopting the federal view that if an organiza-
tion, devoted to the protection and preservation of the
environment, alleges facts sufficient to show that a member of
that organization would have standing to bring the action in his
own name, the organization itself has standing to sue in its own
name.55
JOHN S. JUDE
MUNICIPAL LAW AND EMINENT DOMAIN
In the area of eminent domain, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, during its last term, modified its previous position on
the issue of inverse condemnation in Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State
Highway Commission.1 Respondent Howell Plaza petitioned
the trial court to force the State Highway Commission to pro-
ceed with the condemnation of Howell Plaza's property, claim-
ing that the land was already "occupied" by the Commission.
The supreme court pointed out that in order for such a request
to succeed in the initial stages of the inverse condemnation
proceeding, there must have been either a statutory occupa-
tion,' or a taking of the property such that compensation would
be required under the terms of the Wisconsin Constitution.
The respondent alleged that the conduct of the Highway
Commission in the various stages of plotting and planning the
freeway, short of actual possession, was sufficient deprivation
54. 69 Wis. 2d at 18, 230 N.W.2d at 252.
55. Id. at 20, 230 N.W.2d at 253.
1. 66 Wis. 2d 720, 226 N.W.2d 185 (1975).
2. Wis. STAT. § 32.10 (1973).
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of property to warrant the bringing of an inverse condemnation
suit. The court pointed out that a cause of action by statute3
may arise prior to actual condemnation by the Highway Com-
mission if the complaint alleges facts which indicate the prop-
erty owner has been deprived of all, or substantially all, of the
beneficial use of the property.
The acts alleged by the plaintiff as constituting a taking of
the Howell Plaza property on the part of the Highway Commis-
sion were: plotting, planning, and acquiring of other properties
along the proposed route; public announcements of the pro-
posed construction; notice to tenants of impending road work;
appraisals of land in question; and announcements that just
amounts of money were to be paid for any lands condemned.
Such steps taken by the Commission were held by the court to
be merely preliminary and insufficient to warrant inverse con-
demnation.
The Howell Plaza case goes on, however, to note that the
earlier strict test of "taking" or "occupying" set out in
Muscoda Bridge Co. v. Worden-A len Co.4 is not the only test
of a "taking." There can be a "taking" and an inverse condem-
nation suit can be successfully pursued if less than total posses-
sion takes place. The court will now look to whether a restric-
tion deprives the owner of all, or substantially all of the benefi-
cial use of his property. 5
In Board of Education v. Sinclair,6 the court determined
that the sale of textbooks to students did not violate Article X,
section 3, of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides in part
that:
The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of
district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practica-
ble; and such schools shall be free and without charge for
tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20
years. .... I
The plaintiff had challenged the school's rights to charge fees
for school books and "incidental educational supplies" basing
3. Id.
4. 196 Wis. 76, 219 N.W. 428 (1928).
5. 66 Wis. 2d at 726, 226 N.W.2d at 188
6. 65 Wis. 2d 179, 222 N.W.2d 143 (1974).
7. Wis. Const. art X, § 3.
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his argument on the "free" school provision of Article X, sec-
tion 3.
The court denied his challenge on the grounds that "free"
meant without cost for the surrounding physical facilities-the
school building itself. It interpreted the portion of Article X,
section 3, declaring that schooling would be "without charge
for tuition" to mean that there is to be no charge for instruc-
tion. Included in this category of materials for which there is
to be no charge are pencils, pens, notebooks and paper. It was
further determined that textbooks are only to be provided free
to indigents and that other students must buy or rent the
books.8 Such a holding had recently been sustained by the
Illinois Supreme Court?
The subject of public assistance was dealt with this term in
State ex rel. Sell v. Milwaukee'" where the Milwaukee County
Welfare Department was found to have violated its statutory
duty" to make a factual investigation of an applicant's qualifi-
cations for relief.
Here, the plaintiffs were summarily denied temporary assis-
tance without a hearing or factual determination as to their
need for relief, simply because they refused to comply with a
welfare department rule which required surrender of auto li-
cense plates and title as a prerequisite for admission to tempo-
rary assistance.
The court pointed out that a proper determination of de-
pendency
... must include a finding as to the value of money, income,
property, or credit presently available to the applicant, as
well as a determination of the applicant's level of need for the
services and commodities specified in sec. 49.01(1)."2
When properly assessed, the court points out that relief is to
be furnished to anyone whose "need exceeds the value of his
presently available assets.' 3 The court found that the depart-
ment policy imposed an unauthorized restriction on obtaining
relief in that Wisconsin Statute sections 49.91(1) and (2) do not
8. Wis. STAT. §§ 119.16(5) and 120.12(11) (1973).
9. Homer v. Board of Education, 47 ll. 2d 480, 265 N.E.2d 616 (1970).
10. 65 Wis. 2d 219, 222 N.W.2d 592 (1974).
11. Wis. STAT. §§ 49.02(1), (2) (1971).
12. 65 Wis. 2d at 224, 222 N.W.2d at 595.
13. Id. at 224, 222 N.W.2d at 595.
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require relief recipients to be totally without any assets at all.
All that is required is that the need exceed their assets.
The case of Sambs v. Brookfield'4 delineated the possible
liability of municipalities for negligent maintenance of high-
ways. The plaintiff in this action sued the city of Brookfield for
negligent maintenance of its highways and claimed waiver of
the statutory'5 $25,000 liability limitation for municipalities by
virtue of the defendant city's purchase of insurance in excess
of $1,500,000.
An accident occurred as a result of an accumulation of ice
on a city-maintained road, which caused the driver of the car
plaintiff was riding in to skid and hit a utility pole, injuring the
plaintiff. An accumulation of water on the road caused the icy
conditions which eventually caused the accident. Wisconsin
Statute section 81.15 holds the municipality liable for accumu-
lations of snow or ice if present for three weeks, if the accumu-
lation was "natural" as opposed to "artificial."' 6 The court here
found the three week limitation inapplicable because it felt
that the build-up of ice was artificial. The artificial build-up
was determined to have been caused by defective or inadequate
drainage ditches, which allowed the accumulation to rise be-
yond that which is normal. The city had received notice, but
repeatedly failed to remedy the defect.
The court distinguished Kobelinski v. Milwaukee Suburban
Transport Company,'7 which failed to find an "artificial" accu-
mulation where a city failed to remove ice once it accumulated.
The issue involved there was negligence in removal, as opposed
to the present case where the city negligently caused the accu-
mulation. The court stated:
The purpose of the three week requirement of sec. 81.15
Stats., was stated by this court to be to give the municipali-
ties plenty of opportunity to learn of and remove snow and
ice resulting from natural precipitation, not to provide im-
munity for cases where the municipality has itself negligently
created the icy condition.'8
The issue of damages introduced the problem of whether a
14. 66 Wis. 2d 296, 224 N.W.2d 582 (1975).
15. Wis. STAT. §§ 81.15 and 895.43 (1973).
16. 66 Wis. 2d at 304, 224 N.W.2d at 587.
17. 56 Wis. 2d 504, 204 N.W.2d 415 (1972).
18. 66 Wis. 2d at 307, 224 N.W.2d at 588.
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municipality, by purchasing liability insurance, waives the sta-
tutory limitation of damages set at $25,000. Relying on a Ne-
vada Supreme Court case, 9 which also dealt with a statutory
limitation on liability, the Wisconsin high court held that pur-
chasing of insurance of an amount greater than the statutory
maximum could not be considered a waiver. The Wisconsin
court had previously held that the purchase of insurance in
amounts higher than a statutory maximum was a pro tanto
waiver of the maximum when the liability policy specifically
provided that an insurer could not raise the defense of govern-
mental immunity.0 In the Sambs case, no such clause existed,
and, therefore, no waiver of the $25,000 limitation was found.
Edmonds v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners21 over-
ruled State ex rel. Heffernan v. Board,2 which held that in
cases of police discipline, the municipal board hearing such
complaints need not be any more specific than making a "mere
determination of guilt or innocence."
Factually, two Milwaukee police officers were given six-day
disciplinary suspensions for conduct unbecoming officers as a
result of an incident in a Milwaukee park. The Fire and Police
Commission, in finding the officers guilty, did not specify the
particular acts which constituted the offense.
The court relied upon several recent United States Supreme
Court decisions in coming to the conclusion that a statement
of findings is an integral part of procedural due process.24 In the
present case, the factual basis or specific conduct relied upon
by the board was unknown to the officers and, therefore, de-
prived them of their procedural due process rights.
Probably the most significant case of the term dealing with
municipal law was Hortonville Education Association v. Joint
School District No. 1.25 The action arose out of the March, 1974
strike by teachers and their subsequent discharge by the Hor-
tonville School Board.
19. Taylor v. State, 73 Nev. 151, 131 P.2d 733 (1957).
20. Marshall v. Green Bay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118 N.W.2d 715 (1963).
21. 66 Wis. 2d 337, 224 N.W.2d 575 (1975).
22. 247 Wis. 77, 18 N.W.2d 461 (1945).
23. Id. at 85, 18 N.W.2d at 465.
24. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Willner v. Committee on Characters, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
25. 66 Wis. 2d 469, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct.
34 (1975).
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The first issue dealt with by the court was whether or not
municipal employees could be discharged for such activity.
The court, in relying on both statutory2 and case law, 2 deter-
mined that the school board did have the power and right to
discharge teachers engaged in strike activity.
Secondly, the court determined the issue of whether the
discharge of the striking employees was selective enforcement
of the Wisconsin prohibition against public employee strikes,
thereby denying the teachers equal protection. It was deter-
mined that the question of selective enforcement is "whether
a difference in treatment amounts to invidious discrimina-
tion."28 While admitting that the school board could have pur-
sued injunctive, mediating, or fact finding remedies, as well as
attempting to continue bargaining, the court determined that
the choice of discharge is not, in itself, a denial of equal protec-
tion. The right to discharge here was soundly based in statute,
case law, and the previously negotiated contract. As to unequal
treatment, all striking teachers were offered the same treat-
ment in relation to hearing, discharge, and opportunity to seek
reinstatement. On these grounds, the court denied the request
for a finding of invidious discrimination and denial of due pro-
cess.
The teachers had also alleged a violation of due process
because of the denial of a right to strike, and the lack of arbitra-
tion afforded other public employees. Addressing the lack of
arbitration aspect of this allegation, Justice Beilfuss, stated
that:
Absent a suspect classification or a fundamental right,
[o]nly if a classification is arbitrary and has no reasonable
basis and has no reasonable purpose or reflects no justifiable
public policy will it be held violative of constitutional quar-
antees of equal protection. 9
The court concluded that a reasonable basis grounded in justi-
fiable public policy exists in the present classifications which
require binding arbitration for such public employees as police
26. Wis. STAT. §§ 111.70(4)(1) and 118.22(2) (1973).
27. Millar v. Joint School District, 2 Wis. 2d 303, 312, 86 N.W.2d 455, 460 (1957):
A school board has implied power to dismiss a teacher before the expiration of
his term of service for good and sufficient cause.. . . If a teacher fails to perform
his duties under his contract, the board may discharge him from further service.
28. 66 Wis. 2d at 482, 225 N.W.2d at 665.
29. 66 Wis. 2d at 483-84, 225 N.W.2d at 666.
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and firemen " because of the imminent danger which would
result if they struck. The same could not be held true as to
teachers. The court found such classification to be "'based
upon substantial distinctions which makes one class really dif-
ferent from another.' "s, As to the due process argument in the
public employee strike ban, while admitting the tenuity of pre-
vailing rationale which upholds such strike bans, the court
refused to find the ban unconstitutional:
The strike ban imposed on public employees is based upon a
valid classification and the legislation creating it is not un-
constitutional as a denial of equal protection. If the no-strike
ban legislatively imposed on public employees is to be abol-
ished or altered, it must be done by the legislature and not
the courts."
The fourth issue decided by the court revolved around the
strikers' allegations that they were denied due process because
the group hearing was not considered and their discharges were
not made by an impartial party. The court pointed out that for
there to be a deprivation of due process, the appellants had to
have been deprived of a property or liberty by state action.
Relying on the United States Supreme Court cases of Board of
Regents v. Roth3 and Perry v. Sindermann,34 the Wisconsin
court found that the Hortonville teachers had a property inter-
est in their expectation of future employment to which they
had a legitimate claim. Rejecting the school board's claim that
by striking, the teachers gave up their property rights as circui-
tous, the court found a deprivation of a constitutional property
right. Again, relying on Roth, the court found a deprivation of
liberty in the possible detrimental effect a dismissal from em-
ployment might have on the individual's reputation and his
chances of reemployment. The action of the school board in
dismissing the teachers from public employment was viewed as
state action for the purposes of providing due process to the
teachers. The court determined that "[d]ue process requires
a notice and hearing and an opportunity for the teachers to
30. Wis. STAT. §§ 111.70(4)(jm), and 111.77 (1973).
31. 66 Wis. 2d at 484, 225 N.W.2d at 666, quoting Wiener v. J.C. Penney, 65 Wis.
2d 139, 222 N.W.2d 149 (1974). For a discussion of the Wiener case, see Commercial
Law section, infra.
32. 66 Wis. 2d at 487, 225 N.W.2d at 667.
33. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
34. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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clear themselves of such charges."35 In determining what due
process required in this case, Justice Beilfuss balanced the in-
terest of the school board in summary dismissal against the
teachers' interest in continued employment. He concluded
that, because an impartial decision-maker was crucial to due
process, the teachers were denied due process of law in having
the school board make the decisions as to their dismissals.
Such a conclusion was reached despite the court's admission
that under the present law an impartial decision-maker does
not exist to conduct such public sector hearings: The court,
however, did suggest what it felt was the proper procedure:
[T]he school board should make the initial determination as
to the hiring or firing of one or many teachers. . . . [W]here
due process is required, namely, where the employed teach-
ers' property right or liberty is at stake-notice, a hearing and
a statement of reasons should be given."
The court further provided for de novo determinations by a
court for teachers discharged or disciplined.
The majority decision concluded by remanding to the trial
court for further proceedings by the parties, and by denying
appellant's last contention relating to an alleged violation of
the open meeting law. 7
Justice Robert Hansen, concurring, stated that the action
of the school board was a rescission of their contracts with the
teachers, and that before a party such as the school board is
entitled to rescission, the "essential object" of the contract
must be destroyed. He felt that although the board was within
its right by asserting such a destruction of the contract, it went
beyond its own power, and into the domain of the courts, in
determining for itself that the alleged breach was sufficient to
warrant rescission.
Estate of Peterson,38 another case dealing with public assis-
tance, found the retroactive portion of Wisconsin Statutes sec-
tion 49.195, allowing counties to recover for aid to dependent
children given before the effective date of the statute, to be a
violation of due process. The court found that such a provision
created a new right against the recipient of this aid, or as in
35. 66 Wis. 2d at 491, 225 N.W.2d at 699.
36. Id. at 497-98, 225 N.W.2d at 673.
37. Wis. STAT. § 66.77 (1973).
38. 66 Wis. 2d 535, 225 N.W.2d 644 (1975).
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this case, his estate, where at the time the aid was received no
such right existed. Milwaukee County, relying on McGoon v.
Irvin, 19 advanced the theory that a pre-existing right to recov-
ery was present in common law. It contended that a parent had
a legal duty to support and maintain his own children, and had
to repay another for necessities provided his children. The
court concluded, however, that in the case of public assistance,
there is no promise, express or implied, on the part of the
parent to repay. It is only charity, for which there can be no
recovery.
The common law, based on Saxville v. Bartlett" and State
Department of Public Welfare v. Shirley," requires that the
person sought for liability must have had a common law liabil-
ity to repay, and second, the aid cannot have been gratuitously
given or given under circumstances not raising an implied
promise to repay. Here, there was no common law liability on
the part of Mrs. Peterson to reimburse the county, and, there-
fore, the only recovery that can be had is for aid received after
August 31, 1969, the effective date of Wisconsin Statute section
49.195.
Molbreak v. Village of Shorewood Hills,4 2 altered the state
law with respect to special assessments. The village had, ac-
cording to statute,43 levied special assessments to both com-
mercial and residential property in the amount of $16.72 per
front foot. The village had determined that both the residential
and commercial properties within the area were equally bene-
fited by the improvements. The work proposed included con-
struction of an intersection, curb, gutter, storm-drainage,
street lighting and hydrant work. The plaintiffs brought suit to
have the assessment reduced, contending that their residential
property received no special benefits from the improvements.
The court pointed out that:
It has long been the rule in this state that where the assessing
body did consider what property would be benefited by the
improvement and assessed according to the amount of the
benefit, that in the absence of evidence to the contrary there
39. 1 Wis. (Pin.) 526, 44 A.D. 409 (1845).
40. 126 Wis. 655, 105 N.W. 1052 (1906).
41. 243 Wis. 276, 10 N.W.2d 215 (1943).
42. 66 Wis. 2d 687, 225 N.W.2d 894 (1975).
43. Wis. STAT. § 66.60 (1973).
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is a conclusive presumption that the assessment was on the
basis of benefits actually accrued.44
The supreme court then expressly overruled the language in
Scheldknecht v. Milwaukee,45 which had previously put the
burden on the city to show that the property assessed was
benefited. The court set forth a new burden of proof:
[T]he burden is on the objector to show either that the sta-
tutory procedure was not followed, or that the assessment was
not based on benefits, or that the assessing authority did not
view the premises to make such a determination, or to pro-
duce competent evidence that the assessment is in error.4"
In striking down the residential assessments, the court
found that the plaintiffs had adequately met their new burden
by using expert testimony to the effect that the residential
value of the property was actually reduced by the
commercially-oriented improvements.
Appleton v. ILHR Department 7 determined the issue of
whether DILHR can reverse the findings of its examiner with-
out stating the specific reasons for such rejection. The case
involved a claim for payments under the 1971 Wisconsin Stat-
ute section 66.191, the Wisconsin Retirement Act. The plain-
tiffs husband had died of cancer. At the hearing before the
examiner, there was conflicting and inconclusive testimony as
to whether the cause of death was cancer of the lung, arguably
caused by the deceased's employment, or cancer of the colon,
which the deceased had contracted almost ten years prior to his
death. The department reversed the examiner's denial of pay-
ments without setting forth the reasons therefor.
The Wisconsin statute relating to department reversal of a
hearing examiner" requires a statement of facts and conclu-
sions relied upon. The court, relying on the reasoning of cases
in the area of workmen's compensation,49 determined that the
parties involved in such a case have a right to know the reasons
for the reversal, as well as the basis upon which the reasons
44. 66 Wis. 2d at 696, 225 N.W.2d at 900.
45. 245 Wis. 33, 13 N.W.2d 277 (1944).
46. 66 Wis. 2d at 696, 225 N.W.2d at 900.
47. 67 Wis. 2d 162, 226 N.W.2d 497 (1975).
48. Wis. STAT. § 227.12 (1971).
49. Transamerica Insurance Company v. ILHR Department, 54 Wis. 2d 272, 195
N.W.2d 656 (1972); Braun v. Industrial Commission, 36 Wis. 2d 48, 153 N.W.2d 81
(1967).
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were reached. This, the court held, was particularly true where,
as here, there was contradictory testimony as to the cause of
death. In such cases, the court mandated that in order to reject
the examiner's initial finding, a statement of facts and ulti-
mate conclusions must be provided.
A second issue in the case dealt with double recovery under
both Wisconsin Statute sections 66.191 and 41.14, which re-
spectively deal with special and regular death benefits for pub-
lic employees. The plaintiff had received $21,851 from the Wis-
consin Retirement Fund pursuant to section 41.14. This action
was brought under section 66.191, which prohibits double re-
covery under section 41.13, but fails to mention section 41.14
in its prohibition. The court found that failure to provide for
exclusion of section 41.14 indicates an intention to permit dou-
ble recovery under both sections 41.14 and 66.191.
Justice Heffernan, dissenting, cited Robertson Transporta-
tion Co. v. Public Service Commission," which states that in
a case where two conflicting views are presented, each of which
could be upheld by substantial evidence in the record, it is for
the agency involved to make the determination as to the view
to which it wishes to give .credibility. Justice Heffernan also
pointed out that as long as the presumption afforded by Wis-
consin Statute section 891.45 is allowed to stand, an inference
will be allowed to support an award if the three criteria of
section 891.45 are met. Those are:
The fireman must have been found to be free of any respira-
tory disease at the time of hiring, he must have served a total
of five years as a fireman, and his disability or death must
have been caused by a respiratory disease.'
The dissent persuasively argued that with the presence of the
death certificate citing respiratory disease as cause of death,
the plaintiff should be allowed the benefit of this presumption
and the award of the department.
Village of Sussex v. Department of Natural Resources52 af-
firmed the statutory authority" of the Department of Natural
Resources to order construction of a municipal water system
where there is a nuisance or menace to the health of the public.
50. 39 Wis. 2d 653, 159 N.W.2d 636 (1968).
51. 67 Wis. 2d at 173, 226 N.W.2d at 503.
52. 68 Wis. 2d 187, 228 N.W.2d 173 (1975).
53. Wis. STAT. § 144.025(2)(r) (1975).
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Here, Sussex challenged the right of the Department of Natu-
ral Resources to order such construction on the grounds that
supplying water to residents was a proprietary function, not
governed by Wisconsin Statute chapter 144.11 The court re-
jected the proprietary argument, relying on Holytz v.
Milwaukee,55 which abolished the distinction between proprie-
tary and governmental functions. The court further reasoned
that providing safe water systems to the people was in the
interests of public health, and, therefore, a matter controlled
by the state's police power.5
The village further contended that Wisconsin Statute sec-
tion 66.065 (3), which requires a referendum of the villagers to
establish a water system, renders the order of the department
ineffective until such referendum occurs. The court rejected
this argument citing the superiority of the state's public policy
over the opinion of the local electorate. Wisconsin Statute sec-
tion 144.025(2) (r) was viewed by the court as one of several
alternative ways to exercise the option to establish a water
system. 51 Since the present wells were unsafe, a nuisance was
present and the department was empowered to abate the nuis-
ance. In concluding, the court distinguished the "taking" of
property under eminent domain from the exercise of police
power:
[I]t may be said that the state take the property by eminent
domain because it is useful to the public, and under the po-
lice power because it is harmful. From this results the differ-
ence between the power of eminent domain and the police
power, that the former recognizes a right to compensation,
while the latter principle does not. 8
Therefore, the court goes on to point out, the necessity for
compensation for loss of property because of the state's exercise
54. 68 Wis. 2d at 191, 228 N.W.2d at 176, citing Bino v. Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76
N.W.2d 571 (1956).
55. 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
56. 68 Wis. 2d at 191, 228 N.W.2d at 176.
57. The three alternative methods being:
a. WIs. STAT. § 197 (1973)-condemnation for existing utility plant;
b. Wis. STAT. § 66.065 (1973)-municipality may construct or buy a utility;
c. WIs. STAT. § 144.025(2), (5) (1973)-State-ordered construction under
state's police power.
58. 68 Wis. 2d at 198, 228 N.W.2d at 179, quoting Just v. Marinette County, 56
Wis. 2d 7, 16, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1972).
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of police power comes about when the property is restricted for
public benefit, as opposed to public harm.
MARK W. SCHNEIDER
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
I. WATER LAW-DIFFUSE SURFACE WATERS
The most radical change in the law affecting real property
rights to come out of the August 1974 Term of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was the new water law set down in State v.
Deetz.1 The State of Wisconsin on a public trust theory brought
action against an individual property owner, a development
association, and a town to enjoin them from permitting depos-
its of sand and dirt to accumulate in Lake Wisconsin and on
adjacent roads. The deposit of debris was caused by erosion
which resulted from the construction of roads and clearing of
land for housing. The State also sought forfeitures under the
statute for obstruction of navigable waters2 and for deposit of
deleterious substances in state waters.3
The trial court had dismissed the State's complaint in reli-
ance on the common enemy doctrine which gave a property
owner the right to cause diffuse surface water to be diverted
from his land without regard for any damage which it might do
to neighboring property. The supreme court, after reexamining
the common enemy doctrine in light of other recent decisions
of the court relating to land use and water, announced the
adoption of a new rule governing diffuse surface waters-the
reasonable use rule of the second Restatement of the Law of
Torts.' The case was remanded to the trial court for a determi-
nation of whether the utility of the conduct outweighed the
gravity of the harm caused under the rule of reasonable use.
I1. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS
In Schwanz v. Teper the supreme court addressed the ques-
1. 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1975). This case will not be discussed in any detail
here because of its extensive treatment in the recent article Comment, Wisconsin
Strives to Minimize Conflicts Over the Use of Water, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 145 (1976).
2. Wis. STAT. §§ 30.12(1)(a), 30.15(1) and (3) (1971).
3. Wis. STAT. § 29.29(3) (1971).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 822 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971), § 826 (Tent.
Draft No. 18, 1972), § 827 (Tent. Draft 17, 1971), § 828 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
5. 66 Wis. 2d 157, 223 N.W.2d 896 (1975).
